(Choice) Blind Justice: Legal Implications of the Choice Blindness Phenomenon by Cochran, Kevin J et al.
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 1 Law and Social Science Article 6
1-2018










Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kevin J. Cochran, Rachel L. Greenspan, Daniel F. Bogart & Elizabeth F. Loftus, (Choice) Blind Justice: Legal Implications of the Choice
Blindness Phenomenon, 8 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 85 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol8/iss1/6





(Choice) Blind Justice: Legal Implications 
of the Choice Blindness Phenomenon* 
Kevin J. Cochran, Rachel L. Greenspan,  
Daniel F. Bogart, and Elizabeth F. Loftus** 
Choice blindness is a relatively recent finding in psychology that 
demonstrates that people can often be misled about their own prior 
decisions. Originally studied in the context of preferences and decision-
making, choice blindness has more recently been applied to new domains, 
including the law. Researchers have examined choice blindness in 
relation to eyewitness memory, suspect identification, and even false 
confessions. In the present Article, we review some of the history of choice 
blindness research, as well as this more recent literature in which choice 
blindness is specifically applied to legal contexts. We also review several 
real-life cases in which elements of the choice blindness phenomenon may 
have been at play. While the literature on choice blindness is still 
growing, the research described in the present review, as well as the cases 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 11, 1990, criminal defense attorney David Sotomayor was in 
court, representing his client Christopher Simac.1 Simac had been charged with 
several violations in relation to a traffic accident.2 The state’s sole witness was a 
police officer who had investigated the accident. When the state called the officer 
to testify, he identified the man sitting next to Sotomayor at the counsel’s table as 
the one involved in the accident. As it turned out, the man sitting at the counsel’s 
table was not the defendant, Simac, but rather, a clerk from Sotomayor’s firm. Simac 
was sitting elsewhere in the courtroom. Apparently, as the clerk later testified, 
Sotomayor asked him to come to court that day to see if the state’s witness would 
mistakenly identify him as the defendant. After the clerk testified and Simac took 
the Fifth, the state again called on the police officer to testify, and he once again 
identified the clerk as the man involved in the accident. The court found Simac not 
guilty,3 but Sotomayor was found in contempt of court for intentionally misleading 
the court.4 
In sum, Sotomayor led the officer to make a false identification by covertly 
suggesting that the clerk from his firm was actually the defendant. This type of ploy 
has been used in a number of investigations and legal proceedings (see below), not 
only by the defense, but also by the prosecution. Such tactics raise a question worth 
examining: to what might we attribute the witness’s misidentification? Did the 
officer make a simple memory error, because the clerk and Simac bore some 
resemblance?5 Had he made up his mind prior to testifying that he would simply 
identify the person sitting at the counsel’s table? Or was there a more complicated 
process, whereby he made an implicit assumption that the person sitting at the 
counsel’s table was the defendant, and failed to correct this assumption when the 
person sitting there was not the person from his memory? While it is difficult to 
determine exactly what happened in any individual case, psychological research on 
a phenomenon called choice blindness can help us to understand the psychological 
processes that may be occurring in this type of situation, and thus the contexts in 
which this type of misidentification can occur. 
I. EARLY RESEARCH ON CHOICE BLINDNESS 
Choice blindness refers to the finding that people often fail to notice a 
mismatch between something they previously chose and what they are later told 
they chose.6 In an early demonstration of this effect, researchers invited shoppers 
 
1. People v. Simac, 641 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Ill. 1994). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 418. 
4. Id. at 419. 
5. Id. at 418. 
6. Petter Johansson et al., Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple 
Decision Task, 310 SCI. 116 (2005). 
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in a supermarket to taste test different flavors of jam.7 Subjects were asked to sample 
two varieties and choose which one they preferred. Then, they sampled their 
preferred option again and were asked to explain why they preferred that flavor over 
the other. However, on some trials, the researchers performed a sleight-of-hand 
manipulation, and the flavor the subjects tasted was not the option they had 
previously selected, but rather, the non-selected option.8 The researchers found that 
two-thirds of the shoppers did not detect this switch.9 That is, after sampling two 
similar products and choosing the one that they preferred, subjects did not notice 
when they were given their non-preferred option as if it were what they had chosen. 
Another examination of choice blindness investigated people’s preferences for 
different faces.10 First, subjects were shown photographs of two faces and were 
asked which one they found more attractive. Next, subjects were handed the 
photograph they chose and were asked to explain why they found that face more 
attractive. But unbeknownst to subjects, on a subset of trials, the experimenter 
performed another sleight-of-hand trick; on a manipulated trial, the photograph 
subjects were given was not the one they previously chose, but rather the other, 
unchosen option. Surprisingly, many subjects failed to notice this discrepancy—in 
fact, they detected it only 26% of the time.11 What’s more, subjects sometimes 
confabulated reasons why they chose an option that they never truly chose at all. 
Some subjects’ confabulations even included details that were present only in the 
non-chosen photograph. For instance, when asked why they chose a particular 
photograph, subjects might mention that they liked the woman’s earrings, when the 
photograph that they truly chose did not feature earrings, but the photograph they 
were given did.12 This procedure parallels that used by Simac’s defense counsel: the 
state’s witness, like the research subject, expected that the person he was shown 
would be the person he had previously encountered, and failed to notice when that 
person had been exchanged with someone else. 
Spurred by these compelling early demonstrations of choice blindness, 
researchers have adapted the methodology of these studies to examine the effect in 
more diverse and consequential contexts. Researchers have demonstrated that 
people can be affected by choice blindness in financial decision-making13 and 
political reasoning.14 These experiments help to illustrate the pervasiveness of this 
phenomenon and to delineate the types of errors that people routinely make. 
 
7. Lars Hall et al., Magic at the Marketplace: Choice Blindness for the Taste of Jam and the Smell 
of Tea, 117 COGNITION 54, 56 (2010). 
8. Id. at 57–58. 
9. Id. 
10. Johansson et al., supra note 6. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Owen McLaughlin & Jason Somerville, Choice Blindness in Financial Decision Making, 8 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 561, 577 (2013). 
14. Lars Hall et al., How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness 
to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2013). 
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Another compelling demonstration of the choice blindness phenomenon 
involved misleading subjects about their own political and moral attitudes.15 
Passersby in a park were asked to complete a brief survey by rating their levels of 
agreement with a number of political and moral statements.16 For example, one 
question asked subjects how much they agreed that “governmental surveillance of 
e-mail and internet traffic ought to be forbidden.”17 After completing the survey, 
subjects were asked about a number of their responses. But unbeknownst to the 
subjects, the researchers had performed a subtle switch using a trick apparatus, and 
the original prompts had been exchanged for reversed versions of the prompts, 
while the subjects’ ratings had been retained. Thus, if a subject had originally 
reported that she completely agreed that government web surveillance should be 
forbidden, the survey now indicated that she completely agreed that web 
surveillance ought to be permitted. The researchers found that on more than half of 
their trials, subjects failed to notice this discrepancy.18 This experiment illustrates 
how the choice blindness phenomenon can be observed even for contentious 
decisions in which individuals are highly invested and potentially highly opinionated. 
Furthermore, similarly to previous research, the researchers observed subjects 
confabulating reasons why they held an opinion opposite of what they had originally 
reported.19 
II. LASTING INFLUENCE OF CHOICE BLINDNESS 
Researchers have also explored whether such a manipulation would have any 
lasting effects. Subjects might confabulate reasons why they reported a political 
opinion that they never truly held, but it is possible that their opinion on that issue, 
when measured later, might not change. In fact, research has shown that choice 
blindness can have lasting effects. In one study, subjects were asked to complete an 
inventory of psychological symptoms.20 They were asked, for instance, to rate how 
often they felt symptoms like difficulty concentrating or excessive worrying. They 
were later asked to justify their ratings for several symptoms, while their ratings for 
some “target” symptoms had been increased. The findings indicated that over 60% 
of subjects were blind to (i.e., they did not notice) the discrepancy between their 
initially reported symptom level and the manipulated level.21 At a follow-up test one 
week later, subjects who had been blind to the discrepancies now rated those target 
symptoms higher than non-manipulated symptoms.22 Not only did subjects fail to 
 
15. Lars Hall et al., Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-
Transforming Survey, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012). 
16. Id. at 2. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 5. 
19. Id. 
20. Harald Merckelbach et al., Misinformation Increases Symptom Reporting: A Test-Retest Study, 
2 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. SHORT REP. 1, 1–4 (2011). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
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detect manipulations to their symptom ratings, but these manipulations caused 
changes in their later symptom ratings congruent with the manipulation. 
These findings expand on the choice blindness literature in two important 
ways. First, choice blindness was demonstrated to occur even for personal, internal 
phenomena, like aversive psychological symptoms. Choice blindness, then, is not 
limited to decision-making tasks, but is also applicable to a person’s own internal 
state. Second, choice blindness was shown to have lasting effects. Beyond subjects 
failing to detect the discrepancy between their original report and their manipulated 
report—a finding interesting in its own right—the choice blindness manipulation 
continued to influence subjects a full week later.23 Thus, it is not the case that people 
influenced by choice blindness necessarily revert to their original pre-manipulation 
views or attitudes once the experiment or experience is over. 
Other studies have examined the influence of choice blindness on future 
decision-making.24 In a follow-up to a study described previously,25 subjects were 
shown pairs of faces and asked to identify which face they found more attractive.26 
Then, they were presented with their choice and asked to justify their decision, but 
on some trials, the option they were given was actually the non-selected option. 
After the manipulation, subjects completed a second round of trials in which they 
were given the same pairs of faces a second time to again choose which they found 
more attractive. For control trials—those trials where subjects were given the face 
they had truly chosen—subjects remained remarkably consistent between the first 
and second rounds of trials, choosing the same face over 93% of the time.27 If the 
choice blindness manipulation had no influence on subjects’ later decisions, we 
would expect a similar rate of consistency for manipulated trials—those trials where 
subjects were not given the face they had truly chosen. But this was not the case. 
The researchers found that for manipulated trials, subjects were consistent between 
the two rounds of trials only 57% of the time28—a substantially lower rate. When 
subjects were led to believe they identified a face as more attractive, they were more 
likely to choose that face in the future. This study provided additional evidence that 
choice blindness can have lasting influences for peoples’ attitudes, though in a new 
context: choosing the most attractive of a pair of faces. 
III. (CHOICE) BLIND JUSTICE 
The procedure for choice blindness studies can be remarkably similar to that 
of an eyewitness photo lineup. In both cases, the subject or witness is making an 
evaluative decision. Researchers have noticed this similarity and conducted 
 
23. Id. 
24. Petter Johansson et al., Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like this Paper 
Better if You (Believe You) Chose to Read It! 27 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 281 (2014). 
25. Johansson et al., supra note 6. 
26. Johansson et al., supra note 24. 
27. Id. at 284. 
28. Id. 
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experiments to examine whether choice blindness can occur during an eyewitness 
identification.29 In one study, passersby in a city center were approached by two 
confederates of the experiment who engaged them in conversation.30 Later, the 
subjects were asked to identify the confederates from separate six-person photo 
array lineups. Then, they were shown their choices in turn and asked to justify their 
decisions, but one of their choices had been switched for a foil target. The 
researchers found that over 40% of subjects failed to notice this manipulation.31 
This is a particularly important demonstration of the choice blindness phenomenon 
because it was done in a naturalistic, legally-relevant setting. The subjects had real-
world interaction with the people they were asked to identify. From a theoretical 
standpoint, this study expanded our understanding of choice blindness by showing 
that it could be present in memory tasks in addition to simple preference tasks, such 
as choosing the more attractive face. From a more practical viewpoint, this study 
demonstrated a real-life application for choice blindness research. After an 
eyewitness identifies a target from a lineup, if she is told she identified someone 
else—either due to a misunderstanding, a clerical error, or a deliberate 
manipulation—that eyewitness might fail to notice this error and confabulate an 
explanation for how or why she remembers that target. 
This application for choice blindness research harkens back to the trial of 
Christopher Simac. The police officer can be thought of as a sort of subject in a 
choice blindness study, and Sotomayor can be thought of as the experimenter. At 
some point following a traffic incident, the officer identified, perhaps implicitly, 
Simac as the person involved in the incident. Roughly nine months after the 
incident, Sotomayor situationally influenced the officer into making a 
misidentification by having the clerk sit at the defense counsel’s table at trial. The 
officer failed to detect this mismatch and identified, in two separate instances, the 
clerk as the person involved in the traffic incident. One interesting question that 
arises from this case example is what the police officer remembers now. If a new 
trial were ordered, would the police officer remember Simac as the person involved 
in the traffic incident? Would he remember the clerk? Would he be unable to 
decide? Put differently, can choice blindness have lasting effects on people’s 
memories? Research can help to answer these questions as well. First, however, it is 
worth examining an example of how this might happen. 
 
29. Anna Sagana et al., Witnesses’ Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions: A Field 
Study, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 624 (2013) [hereinafter Sagana et al., Witnesses’ Blindness]; Anna Sagana et 
al., ‘This Is the Person You Selected’: Eyewitnesses’ Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions, 
28 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 753, 753 (2014) [hereinafter Sagana et al., ‘This Is the Person You 
Selected’ ]. 
30. Sagana et al., Witnesses’ Blindness, supra note 29. 
31. Id. 
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IV. BLINDSIGHT IS 20/20 
On August 21, 2003, Norris and Sheryl Hilde were both shot while camping.32 
Norris died from his injuries, but Sheryl managed to speak to a 911 operator and 
referred to the shooter or shooters as “they.”33 While being transported in an 
ambulance and critically injured, Hilde told a first responder that the shooter had 
been a person she had seen earlier at the campsite (i.e., Samuel Lawson). But she 
also identified the pilot of the helicopter as the shooter, and she also said she did 
not know who the shooters were and had never seen their faces.34 On August 23, 
Hilde, who was medicated, unable to speak due to a breathing tube, and recovering 
from her wounds, was unable to select Lawson out of a photo lineup. However, 
police led her through a series of leading questions, culminating in her identifying 
as the shooter the man she had seen earlier at the campsite.35 When interviewed a 
month later, Hilde again failed to identify Lawson from a lineup. When interviewed 
another week later, Hilde had no memory of the August 23 interview. But when she 
was asked to review her responses to the leading questions asked by the police, she 
came to believe, and later remembered, that the man from her campsite, Lawson, 
was the shooter. At trial, when Hilde was asked if she had any doubt that Lawson 
was the shooter, she responded that she did not, and added that she “always knew 
it was him.”36 Lawson was convicted in December 2005, but in March 2014, on 
appeal, the prosecution dismissed the charges.37 
While we cannot know the precise details of any individual case, Sheryl Hilde’s 
experience can be interpreted as an example of the choice blindness phenomenon. 
During her recovery, she had no memory of the police interview in which she 
“identified” Lawson.38 However, when she was shown an account of what she had 
previously reported, an account that did not reflect her true memory, but instead 
reflected the misleading questions she was asked, her memory changed to be 
consistent with that report.39 Her confidence in her memory changed so 
substantially that at trial, she reported not only that she had no doubt that Lawson 
was the shooter, but that she “always knew it was him.”40 
Psychological researchers have long known that memory can be distorted by 
suggestive influences. After witnessing an event, like a car speed through a stop sign, 
if people are exposed to misleading information about that event, for instance, 
telling them that the sign at the intersection was a yield sign, many of them will later 
 
32. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 678 (Or. 2012). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 680. 
35. Id. at 679. 
36. Id. at 680. 
37. Id. at 698; see also Maurice Possley, Samuel Lawson, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS  
(Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4393 
[https://perma.cc/2VDE-PUVM]. 
38. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 679. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 680. 
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remember having seen a yield sign during the original event.41 This robust finding, 
replicated and expanded upon in numerous experiments, is known as the 
misinformation effect.42 In simple terms, exposing people to misinformation about 
a past event can impair people’s memory for the details of the event. Sheryl Hilde’s 
experience was a sort of amalgam of choice blindness and the misinformation effect. 
She received misleading information that influenced her memory, but that 
misleading information was in the form of a manipulated version of her own 
memory report. 
Two experiments have investigated this precise phenomenon: to what extent 
can choice blindness influence subjects’ subsequent memory for a witnessed 
event.43 In the first experiment, subjects first watched a slideshow depicting a 
female character interacting with several other characters, one of whom steals her 
wallet.44 Next, the subjects answered questions about their memories for details of 
the slideshow, like the color of the thief’s jacket. Later, the subjects were shown 
their previous reports, but some of their answers had been manipulated; subjects 
who had initially reported that the thief wore a green jacket might be told they 
reported a blue jacket. Finally, the subjects answered the same memory questions a 
second time. The researchers were interested in the level of (in)consistency between 
subjects’ initial reports and their final reports in light of the misinformation. The 
results revealed that when subjects were shown manipulated versions of their own 
memory reports, their memories changed significantly more than when they were 
shown their true previous memory reports.45 Moreover, their memories changed to 
be consistent with the misleading information they received.46 This study’s major 
contribution was to show that people could be misled by fabricated versions of their 
own memory reports, and that these fabricated reports influenced people’s future 
memories. 
A second study followed a similar procedure.47 Subjects first watched a 
depiction of a man stealing a stereo from a car, and then identified the suspect from 
a six-person photo lineup. Later, the subjects were shown the face they had selected 
and asked to describe how they had made that selection. But for some subjects, the 
face they were shown at this stage was not the one they had identified, but rather, 
another member of the lineup. Over half of the subjects failed to notice this 
manipulation.48 Later in the study, the subjects were shown the same lineup a 
 
41. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual Memory, 
4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 19 (1978). 
42.  Michael S. Ayers & Lynne M. Reder, A Theoretical Review of the Misinformation Effect: Predictions 
from an Activation-Based Memory Model, 5 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1, 1 (1998). 
43. Kevin J. Cochran et al., Memory Blindness: Altered Memory Reports Lead to Distortion in 




47. Id. at 721–23. 
48. Id. 
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second time and were asked again to select the person they remembered seeing from 
the slideshow. Of the subjects who had received the choice blindness manipulation, 
35% changed their responses for the second lineup, and this was significantly 
greater than the rate of memory change for the control subjects.49 However, this 
35% figure collapses across all subjects, including both those who detected the 
manipulation and those who were blind to it.50 Detection significantly influenced 
the rate of memory change. When confining the analysis to only those subjects who 
were blind to the manipulation, 54% changed their responses between the two 
lineups, compared to only 13% of those who noticed the manipulation.51 It is also 
worth noting that when subjects changed their responses between the two lineups, 
the majority of them identified the person implicated by the misinformation rather 
than one of the foil targets.52 This study demonstrated that subjects’ memories can 
be influenced by misleading versions of their own memory reports, not only for 
their memories of episodic details, but also for their memories of a crime 
perpetrator’s face. 
Telling someone they made a particular choice can be a powerful 
manipulation. Research on choice blindness has shown that people often fail to 
scrutinize information if they are told that that information represents their own 
decisions or preferences. This blindness can have lasting effects in diverse contexts, 
influencing subjects’ later medical symptom reporting, preferences and attitudes, 
and eyewitness memory. 
V. BLINDLY CONFESSING 
Choice blindness can have implications for the legal field beyond the study of 
eyewitness memory. One study explored how choice blindness might apply to the 
issue of interrogations and confessions.53 This context may be one in which suspects 
are especially vulnerable to the effects of choice blindness, as police in the United 
States can legally lie to suspects during interrogations. For instance, police can 
falsely inform a suspect that their co-conspirator confessed in order to elicit a 
confession.54 Not only is this legally permitted, research indicates that officers 
frequently receive training in this practice.55 In a survey of students at the FBI 
National Academy, 73.2% reported receiving training in providing false evidence to 






53. Melanie Sauerland et al., “ Yes, I Have Sometimes Stolen Bikes”: Blindness for Norm-Violating 
Behaviors and Implications for Suspect Interrogations, 31 BEHAV. SCI. L. 239 (2013). 
54. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
55. Hayley M. D. Cleary & Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and Interrogation 
Methods: A Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 270, 
275 (2016). 
56. Id. 
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also high for interrogations involving juvenile suspects (56.5% and 69.7% 
respectively).57 In an environment in which deception is permitted and even 
encouraged, choice blindness might be particularly likely to occur. 
In one choice blindness study, researchers asked subjects to complete a 
questionnaire probing their history of norm-violating behaviors.58 These behaviors 
included both legal activities like cheating on a high-school exam, and illegal 
activities like shoplifting. Subjects responded to each item on a four-point scale, 
anchored at “never” and “always.”59 Unbeknownst to the subject, the experimenter 
had manipulated two of the responses by two scale points. Thus, if a subject 
reported that they had “never” shoplifted, their report would later read that they 
had “sometimes” shoplifted. Later, subjects were asked to elaborate on their 
responses. The researchers found that the subjects failed to detect about 15% of 
the manipulations.60 While this blindness rate is somewhat lower than the rate in 
some other choice blindness studies, it still represents an incredible effect; roughly 
15% of the time, subjects failed to notice a manipulation that incriminated them. 
The researchers also conducted a follow-up study in which they employed a longer 
retention interval. In this experiment, subjects completed the questionnaire about 
norm-violating behaviors in one session and were given misinformation about their 
responses a week later. When subjects followed this modified procedure, 36% failed 
to notice the incriminating manipulation.61 This study also included a follow-up five 
to six weeks after the initial testing. As was the case in some of the studies already 
discussed, the researchers found evidence that the choice blindness manipulation 
had a lasting effect on subjects’ memories.62 
But could real-life suspects actually be induced to confess through the use of 
choice blindness? The murder of Martha Moxley provides some evidence that they 
could.63 In 1991, after newspaper reports of a cover-up in the case, State Inspector 
John Solomon was assigned to reinvestigate the murder.64 Solomon soon began to 
suspect Ken Littleton and eventually created a plan to elicit a confession from him.65 
He befriended Mary Baker, Littleton’s ex-wife, with whom Littleton was hoping to 
reconcile. Solomon convinced Baker to assist him in eliciting a confession from 
Littleton. Baker arranged a meeting with her ex-husband under the premise that she 
must know the truth about what happened to Moxley before they could reconcile. 
She then went on to falsely inform him that, during a car trip several years earlier, 
he confessed to the murder. Littleton denied the accusation. However, several 
 
57. Id. 





63. TIMOTHY DUMAS, GREENTOWN: MURDER AND MYSTERY IN GREENWICH, AMERICA’S 
WEALTHIEST COMMUNITY (2d ed. 2013). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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months later, Littleton agreed to a polygraph test in order to exonerate himself. 
Despite having previously denied that he confessed when it was suggested by Baker, 
Littleton conceded during the polygraph that he had confessed to the crime. And, 
in court, when directly asked “did you ever tell Mary [Baker] that you stabbed 
Martha Moxley through the neck,”66 he claimed that he had. However, he added 
that he had no memory of his confession.67 Thus, this type of choice blindness 
manipulation led Littleton to “admit” that he confessed to the murder, despite him 
initially having no memory of the confession. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Choice blindness is the finding that people often fail to notice if they are told 
they made a decision different from the decision they actually made. In fact, people 
often come to endorse the choice they initially rejected, and even confabulate 
reasons why they made a decision that they never actually made in the first place.68 
Choice blindness can leave lasting influences: people led to believe that they chose 
a particular option are more likely to choose that option again in the future. This is 
true when asked about their preferences between two faces,69 their internal 
psychological state,70 and their memories for events that they witnessed.71 Choice 
blindness is also distinct from other psychological findings in relation to eyewitness 
memory. For instance, the misinformation effect is the finding that if people are 
exposed to misleading information in the wake of witnessing an event (like a crime 
or accident), they often incorporate this misleading information into their memories 
for the event.72 Research on the choice blindness phenomenon, by contrast, focuses 
primarily on whether people detect that the misleading information is in fact false, 
and involves misleading subjects about their own previously stated preferences, 
beliefs, and memories. 
CONCLUSION 
In this review, we have discussed a number of studies in which researchers 
have directly investigated choice blindness for legally-relevant decisions and 
discussed some examples of what happens when these procedures are used in real 
life. A field study demonstrated that after making an eyewitness identification, 
people often fail to notice when they are told they identified someone different 
from who they actually did.73 Other researchers took this one step further by 
showing that choice blindness can having lasting influences on peoples’ memories. 
 
66. Id. at 302. 
67. Id. 
68. Hall et al., supra note 7; Johansson et al., supra note 6. 
69. Johansson et al., supra note 24. 
70. Merckelbach et al., supra note 20. 
71. Cochran et al., supra note 43. 
72. Loftus et al., supra note 41. 
73. Sagana et al., Witnesses’ Blindness, supra note 29. 
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When witnesses are told they reported different details from what they actually 
reported, or identified someone different from whom they truly identified, their 
memories can be influenced by this misinformation.74 They may then recall the 
events in ways consistent with the misinformation they received, rather than how 
the events truly unfolded.75 Another study misled subjects about their own 
responses to a survey querying their history of criminal and norm-violating 
behavior, demonstrating that choice blindness can induce people to incriminate 
themselves.76 This is not an effect that exists merely in the laboratory. The cases of 
Christopher Simac,77 Samuel Lawson,78 and Martha Moxley79 all included elements 
of choice blindness, and all three cases panned out as the literature would have 
predicted. When people are told that they made a report that they never truly 
made—whether that decision is an eyewitness identification, details in witness 
statement, or a confession to a crime—they are often blind to this discrepancy, and 
this blindness can have important, lasting consequences. 
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78. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 678 (Or. 2012). 
79. DUMAS, supra note 63. 
